A BILL TO BE ENTITLED
AN ACT to abolish contributory negligence and establish modified comparative negligence by ALLOWING recovery if the plaintiff's contributory negligence is less than or equal to the defendant's negligence.
The General Assembly of North Carolina enacts:
SECTION 1.(a)  G.S. 1B‑2 reads as rewritten:
"§ 1B‑2.  Pro rata shares.
In determining the pro rata shares of tort‑feasors in the entire liability
(1)	Their relative degree of fault shall be considered;
(2)	If equity requires, the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute a single share; and
(3)	Principles of equity applicable to contribution generally shall apply."
SECTION 1.(b)  G.S. 1‑139 is repealed.
SECTION 1.(c)  Article 15 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes is amended by adding a new section to read:
"§ 1‑139.1.  Recovery based upon comparing negligence.
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in any action by any person or legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property if the contributory negligence was equal to or less than the negligence which must be established in order to recover from the party against whom recovery is sought."
SECTION 2.(a)  G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 8(c), reads as rewritten:
"(c)	Affirmative defenses. – In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, truth in actions for defamation, usury, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. Such pleading shall contain a short and plain statement of any matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense sufficiently particular to give the court and the parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court, on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation."
SECTION 2.(b)  G.S. 20‑11(l) reads as rewritten:
"(l)	Violations. – It is unlawful for the holder of a limited learner's permit, a temporary permit, or a limited provisional license to drive a motor vehicle in violation of the restrictions that apply to the permit or license. Failure to comply with a restriction concerning the time of driving or the presence of a supervising driver in the vehicle constitutes operating a motor vehicle without a license. Failure to comply with the restriction regarding the use of a mobile telephone while operating a motor vehicle is an infraction punishable by a fine of twenty‑five dollars ($25.00). Failure to comply with any other restriction, including seating and passenger limitations, is an infraction punishable by a monetary penalty as provided in G.S. 20‑176. Failure to comply with the provisions of subsections (e) and (g) of this section shall not constitute negligence per se by the driver or passenger in any action for the recovery of damages arising out of the operation, ownership or maintenance of a motor vehicle. Any evidence of failure to comply with the provisions of subdivisions (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) of subsection (e) of this section shall not be admissible in any criminal or civil trial, action, or proceeding except in an action based on a violation of this section. No drivers license points or insurance surcharge shall be assessed for failure to comply with seating and occupancy limitations in subsection (e) of this section. No drivers license points or insurance surcharge shall be assessed for failure to comply with subsection (e) or (g) of this section regarding the use of a mobile telephone while operating a motor vehicle."
SECTION 2.(c)  G.S. 20‑126(c) reads as rewritten:
"(c)	No person shall operate a motorcycle upon the streets or highways of this State unless such motorcycle is equipped with a rearview mirror so mounted as to provide the operator with a clear, undistorted and unobstructed view of at least 200 feet to the rear of the motorcycle. No motorcycle shall be registered in this State after January 1, 1968, unless such motorcycle is equipped with a rearview mirror as described in this section. Violation of the provisions of this subsection shall not be considered negligence per se in any civil action."
SECTION 2.(d)  G.S. 20‑137.1(d) reads as rewritten:
"(d)	A violation of this section shall have all of the following consequences:
(1)	Two drivers license points shall be assessed pursuant to G.S. 20‑16.
(2)	No insurance points shall be assessed.
(3)	The violation shall not constitute negligence per se.
(4)	The violation shall not be evidence of negligence."
SECTION 2.(e)  G.S. 20‑137.4(f) reads as rewritten:
"(f)	Penalty. – A violation of this section shall be a Class 2 misdemeanor and shall be punishable by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00). No drivers license points or insurance surcharge shall be assessed as a result of a violation of this section. Failure to comply with the provisions of this section shall not constitute negligence per se by the operator in any action for the recovery of damages arising out of the operation, ownership, or maintenance of a school bus."
SECTION 2.(f)  G.S. 20‑137.4A(c) reads as rewritten:
"(c)	Penalty. – A violation of this section while operating a school bus, as defined in G.S. 20‑137.4(a)(4), shall be a Class 2 misdemeanor and shall be punishable by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00). Any other violation of this section shall be an infraction and shall be punishable by a fine of one hundred dollars ($100.00) and the costs of court.
No drivers license points or insurance surcharge shall be assessed as a result of a violation of this section. Failure to comply with the provisions of this section shall not constitute negligence per se by the operator in any action for the recovery of damages arising out of the operation, ownership, or maintenance of a vehicle."
SECTION 2.(g)  G.S. 20‑140.4(b) reads as rewritten:
"(b)	Violation of any provision of this section shall not be considered negligence per se in any civil action."
SECTION 2.(h)  G.S. 20‑141(n) reads as rewritten:
"(n)	Notwithstanding any other provision contained in G.S. 20‑141 or any other statute or law of this State, the failure of a motorist to stop his vehicle within the radius of its headlights or the range of his vision shall not be held negligence per se."
SECTION 2.(i)  G.S. 20‑158(d) reads as rewritten:
"(d)	No failure to stop as required by the provisions of this section shall be considered negligence per se in any action at law for injury to person or property, but the facts relating to such failure to stop may be considered with the other facts in the case in determining whether a party was guilty of negligence."
SECTION 2.(j)  G.S. 20‑158.1 reads as rewritten:
"§ 20‑158.1.  Erection of "yield right‑of‑way" signs.
The Department of Transportation, with reference to State highways, and cities and towns with reference to highways and streets under their jurisdiction, are authorized to designate main‑traveled or through highways and streets by erecting at the entrance thereto from intersecting highways or streets, signs notifying drivers of vehicles to yield the right‑of‑way to drivers of vehicles approaching the intersection on the main‑traveled or through highway. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Chapter, except G.S. 20‑156, whenever any such yield right‑of‑way signs have been so erected, it shall be unlawful for the driver of any vehicle to enter or cross such main‑traveled or through highway or street unless he shall first slow down and yield right‑of‑way to any vehicle in movement on the main‑traveled or through highway or street which is approaching so as to arrive at the intersection at approximately the same time as the vehicle entering the main‑traveled or through highway or street. No failure to so yield the right‑of‑way shall be considered negligence per se in any action at law for injury to person or property, but the facts relating to such failure to yield the right‑of‑way may be considered with the other facts in the case in determining whether either party in such action was guilty of negligence."
SECTION 2.(k)  G.S. 20‑175.3 reads as rewritten:
"§ 20‑175.3.  Rights and privileges of blind persons without white cane or guide dog.
Nothing contained in this Part shall be construed to deprive any blind or partially blind person not carrying a cane white in color or white tipped with red, or being accompanied by a guide dog, of any of the rights and privileges conferred by law upon pedestrians crossing streets and highways, nor shall the failure of such blind or partially blind person to carry a cane white in color or white tipped with red, or to be accompanied by a guide dog, upon the streets, roads, highways or sidewalks of this State, be held to constitute or be evidence of negligence by virtue of this Part."
SECTION 2.(l)  G.S. 95‑229.12 reads as rewritten:
"§ 95‑229.12.  Application.
Nothing in this Article shall relieve any person from complying with any safety rule, regulation, or statute not imposed by this Article. A violation of this Article shall not constitute negligence, nor give rise to any cause of action based upon injury to persons or property. An action may be brought by an owner or operator of a high‑voltage line to recover the cost of precautionary safety arrangements or for damage to its facilities. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to alter, amend, restrict, or limit the liability of any person for violation of that person's duty under law; nor shall any person be relieved from liability as a result of violations of standards under existing law where such violations of existing standards of care are found to be a cause of damage to property, personal injury, or death."
SECTION 2.(m)  G.S. 113‑291.8(c) reads as rewritten:
"(c)	Failure to wear hunter orange material in violation of this section shall not constitute negligence."
SECTION 2.(n)  G.S. 143‑291(a) reads as rewritten:
"(a)	The North Carolina Industrial Commission is hereby constituted a court for the purpose of hearing and passing upon tort claims against the State Board of Education, the Board of Transportation, and all other departments, institutions and agencies of the State. The Industrial Commission shall determine whether or not each individual claim arose as a result of the negligence of any officer, employee, involuntary servant or agent of the State while acting within the scope of his office, employment, service, agency or authority, under circumstances where the State of North Carolina, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the laws of North Carolina. If the Commission finds that there was negligence on the part of an officer, employee, involuntary servant, or agent of the State while acting within the scope of their office, employment, service, agency, or authority that was the proximate cause of the injury and any negligence on the part of the claimant or the person in whose behalf the claim is asserted, was equal to or less than the negligence on the part of the officer, employee, involuntary servant, or agent of the State, the Commission shall determine the amount of damages that the claimant is entitled to be paid, including medical and other expenses, and by appropriate order direct the payment of damages as provided in subsection (a1) of this section, but in no event shall the amount of damages awarded exceed the amounts authorized in G.S. 143‑299.2 cumulatively to all claimants on account of injury and damage to any one person arising out of a single occurrence. Community colleges and technical colleges shall be deemed State agencies for purposes of this Article. The fact that a claim may be brought under more than one Article under this Chapter shall not increase the foregoing maximum liability of the State."
SECTION 2.(o)  G.S. 143‑299.1 reads as rewritten:
"§ 143‑299.1.  Negligence a matter of defense; burden of proof.
Any negligence on the part of the claimant or the person in whose behalf the claim is asserted shall be deemed to be a matter of defense on the part of the State agency, department, or institution against which the claim is asserted, and such State department, institution or agency shall have the burden of proving that the claimant or the person in whose behalf the claim is asserted was guilty of negligence that was equal to or less than the negligence which must be established in order to prevail against the State agency, department, or institution against which the claim is asserted."
SECTION 2.(p)  G.S. 143‑300.1A reads as rewritten:
"§ 143‑300.1A.  Claims arising from certain smallpox vaccinations of State employees.
The North Carolina Industrial Commission shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine claims in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Article made against the State by a person who is permanently or temporarily living in the home of a State employee who receives in employment vaccination against smallpox incident to the Administration of Smallpox Countermeasures by Health Professionals, section 304 of the Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107‑296 (Nov. 25, 2002) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 233(p)) when the person contracts an infection with smallpox or an infection with vaccinia or has any adverse medical reaction due to the vaccination received by the employee. A person covered by this section shall be entitled to recover from the State damages incurred by the person that are directly attributable to the vaccination of the employee under this section. No showing of negligence is required under this section. The provisions of G.S. 143‑299.1 shall not apply to claims made under this section. Damages awarded under this section shall be paid in accordance with G.S. 143‑291(a1) and shall be subject to the same limits as those which apply to tort claims under this Article."
SECTION 3.  G.S. 1A‑1, Rule 7(a), reads as rewritten:
"(a)	Pleadings. – There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counterclaim denominated as such; an answer to a crossclaim, if the answer contains a crossclaim; a third‑party complaint if a person who was not an original party is summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third‑party answer, if a third‑party complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed except that the court may order a reply to an answer or a third‑party answer."
SECTION 4.  G.S. 90‑95.5 reads as rewritten:
"§ 90‑95.5.  Civil liability – employing a minor to commit a drug offense.
A person 21 years of age or older, who hires, employs, or intentionally uses a person under 18 years of age to commit a violation of G.S. 90‑95 is liable in a civil action for damages for drug addiction proximately caused by the violation. The doctrine of assumption of risk is no defense to liability under this section."
SECTION 5.  This act becomes effective on October 1, 2023, and applies to claims arising on or after that date.